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1. Introduction 
In his highly influential book Making Things Happen, James Woodward argues 
for an interventionist theory of causation. In the recent debate, the interventionist 
theory has been enthusiastically received as an adequate theory of causation in the 
special sciences. Especially, the interventionist theory has been taken to apply to 
the social and the biomedical sciences (for instance and apart from Woodward’s 
own work, by Craver 2007 in philosophy of neuroscience, Waters 2007 in 
philosophy of biology, Campbell 2007 and Shapiro & Sober 2007 in philosophy 
of psychology, and Hausman 2009 in philosophy of economics).  
 The key idea underlying interventionist account – which also defines other 
causal notions besides direct causation – is that, roughly, X is a cause of Y iff there 
is a possible intervention on X that changes Y (cf. Woodward 2003: 59 for 
Woodward’s central definition M). For instance, Woodward defines the notion of 
a direct (type-level) cause as follows: 
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to 
some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change 
Y (or the probability distribution of Y) when all other variables are held fixed at 
some value by interventions. (Woodward 2003: 55) 
 
The central character of interventions in Woodward’s framework is obvious: 
Woodward’s definitions of various causal notions imply that the truth of a causal 
statement “X directly causes Y“ requires the existence of a possible intervention 
on X. Another way to make the same point is that if “X directly causes Y” is true, 
then the following interventionist counterfactuals have to be true: “if there were 
an intervention I = i on X such that X = x, then Y = y would be the case”, and “if 
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there were an intervention I = i* on X such that X = x*, then Y = y* would be the 
case” (with i≠i*, x≠x*, y≠y*). Woodward requires that interventions be merely in 
principle possible. Woodward interprets in principle possibility as logical 
possibility. Call this the modal character of interventions.  
Let me add two clarifications at this point. First, what kind of a project is 
Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation? It is crucial to emphasize that 
Woodward is not concerned with the methodology of causation, i.e. the 
construction of algorithms that allow to infer causal models from statistical data 
(cf. Woodward 2003: 38).1 The aim of interventionists is to provide a semantic 
account of causal statements. Woodward is very explicit about the semantic goal 
of his approach: “my aim is to give an account of the content or meaning of 
various locutions, such as X causes Y […]” (Woodward 2003: 38, my emphasis, 
cf. also 2003: 7-9, 2008: 194-196).2 
Second, how does the claim that there is a possible intervention relate to 
interventionist counterfactuals of the form “if there were an intervention I = i on 
X such that X = x, then Y = y would be the case”? According to the standard 
possible worlds semantics, sentences such as “it is possible to intervene on X” or, 
alternatively, “there is a possible intervention I = i on X” are true iff I = i is an 
intervention on X in at least one possible world. When we describe – following 
interventionists – what would happen under an intervention I = i by using an 
interventionist counterfactual, we evaluate the conditional in a possible – actual or 
counterfactual – world in which (among other constraints) I = i is an intervention 
                                                 
1 “By contrast [to Pearl’s and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines’s work], I have nothing to say about 
issues having to with calculating quantitative magnitudes, estimation, identifiability, or causal 
inference. Instead, my enterprise is, roughly, to provide an account of the meaning or content of 
just those qualitative causal notions that Pearl (and perhaps Spirtes et al.) take as primitive. 
Because my project is semantic or interpretative, and is not intended as a contribution to practical 
problems of causal inference […].” (Woodward 2003: 38, my emphasis) 
2 To be fair, I have to concede that Woodward (2008) initially describes his project as 
methodological in a reply to Michael Strevens’ worry that interventionism suggests that causal 
facts are fundamental. However, although Woodward initially characterizes his project as being 
methodological in the opening pages of his reply to Strevens, this label does not match the 
questions he takes his project to answer: “given that a directed graph or a system of equations can 
be used, qua representational device, to represent both patterns of correlations and systems of 
causal relationships, what conditions have to be met for these devices to accurately represent the 
latter rather than the former? […] If we wanted to try to capture the notion of one events being an 
actual cause of another within a structural equations or directed graph framework, how would we 
do so?” (cf. Woodward 2008: 194f). I think these questions are solely concerned with the semantic 
interpretation of causal statements (relative to a causal model) and the explication of causal 
notions.     
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on X. One might worry that referring to possible world semantics in order to 
understand Woodward’s account of causation is wrong-headed, because 
Woodward explicitly rejects Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactuals 
(cf. Woodward 2003: 133-145). However, taking a closer look reveals that 
Woodward merely objects to Lewis’s similarity measure for the closeness of 
world (cf. Woodward 2003: 139, 142 for two counterexamples against Lewis’s 
similarity metric). Woodward’s position is entirely coherent with the general idea 
of Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals: that is, a counterfactual is true at a 
world w iff the consequent is true in the closest antecedent-worlds.3 This general 
idea of Lewis’s semantics can be distinguished from Lewis’s specific proposal for 
selecting the closest worlds (i.e. his similarity metric). One appealing way to 
understand Woodward is to say that he deviates from Lewis by using a different 
measure for closeness of worlds. From Woodward’s point of view, the most 
obvious candidate for such a measure is this one: the closest antecedent-worlds 
are those in which the antecedent is the outcome of an intervention (cf. 
Woodward 2003: 135f., Woodward & Hitchcock 2003: 13f. for the claim that 
interventions play a similar role as Lewisian small miracles by selecting the 
closest possible antecedent-worlds). I will return to interventionist semantics in 
Section 4. The main point I would like to stress here is that using standard 
possible worlds semantics in order to understand (a) existential claims about 
possible interventions and (b) interventionist counterfactuals is compatible with 
Woodward’s theory of causation (including his objections to Lewis’s similarity 
metric).         
However, despite the prima facie virtues4 of interventionist theories of 
causation, I will argue that the key notion of the interventionist approach – the 
notion of a possible intervention – turns out to be deeply problematic. In 
particular, I will argue that Woodward’s notion of an intervention is problematic 
                                                 
3 However, Woodward’s worlds should be understood as model worlds or small worlds, i.e. 
assignments of values to variables in a causal model (cf. Pearl 2000: 207). In this respect, 
Woodwardian worlds differ from Lewisian worlds because the latter are as typically as detailed as 
the real spatio-temporal entity we inhabit (cf. Hüttemann 2004: 113). 
4 Interventionist theories are considered to be successful because (a) they explicate several kinds of 
causation that are referred to in the sciences (e.g. actual causes, type-level causes, indeterministic 
causes etc.), (b) they account for several typical features of causation (e.g. the time-asymmetry of 
causation), and (c) they provide a successful description of intuitively possible causal scenarios 
(such as preemption scenarios), 
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because of the modal character of possible interventions. I will argue for two 
claims against Woodward: 
  
1. Either merely logically possible interventions are dispensable for the 
semantic project of providing an account of the meaning of causal 
statements. If interventions are indeed dispensable, the interventionist 
theory collapses into (some sort of) a counterfactual theory of causation.5 
Thus, the interventionist theory is not tenable as a theory of causation in 
its own right.  
2. Or, if one maintains that merely logically possible interventions are 
indispensable, then interventions with this modal character lead to the fatal 
result that interventionist counterfactuals are evaluated inadequately. 
Consequently, interventionists offer an inadequate theory of causation.  
 
What I argue in this paper is compatible with the view that interventions are 
important (and maybe even indispensable) for the methodological task of 
discovering causal relations or inferring causal models from statistical data (i.e. 
the methodological project which Woodward explicitly distinguishes from his 
own). My arguments are solely directed against the interventionist theory as a 
semantic project. In SECTION 2, I will briefly describe Woodward’s notion of an 
intervention. In SECTION 3, I will discuss which kind of possibility is presupposed 
in Woodward’s notion of possible interventions. I will present a case that is 
supposed to show that it would be unwise to require that interventions must be 
physically possible. Woodward himself discusses this kind of counterexample 
against the requirement that interventions need to be physically possible. Reacting 
to the counterexample, Woodward rejects the claim that interventions have to be 
physically possible and requires interventions to be merely logically possible. In 
the central SECTION 4, I present two arguments against the adequacy of an account 
of causation framed in terms of logically possible interventions. In the first 
argument, I will show that merely logically possible interventions are superfluous 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, Woodward’s interventionist theory collapses into invariance theories of causation 
– i.e. to the extent to which invariance theories can be formulated without the Woodwardian 
notion of an intervention. 
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and can be dispensed with for pursuing the semantic project of providing truth-
conditions for causal claims  (first claim above). In the second argument, I will 
take a different stance and leave aside the indispensability arguments. I will show 
that relying on merely logically possible interventions conflicts with the standard 
approaches to the meaning of counterfactuals. If an existential claim about a 
merely logically possible intervention figures in the antecedent of an 
interventionist counterfactual, then this leads to the fatal result that this 
interventionist counterfactual is evaluated as false, although we would take these 
counterfactuals to be true. I will argue that also the obvious strategy to choose 
from an interventionist point of view – i.e. to adopt an interventionist semantics 
(cf. Reutlinger 2011) – does not solve the problem. In SECTION 5, I conclude that 
when analyzing causal concepts and stating the truth conditions of causal claims 
we best get rid of Woodwardian interventions. 
 
2. Woodward’s Concept of an Intervention 
Woodward defines interventions in two steps: first he defines an intervention 
variable, then he uses the notion of an intervention variable in order to define the 
notion of an intervention. A variable I is an intervention variable for X relative to 
Y iff the conjunction of the following conditions is satisfied: 
  
(a) I is a cause of X. 
(b) There is at least some value of I such that if I takes this value, then X 
depends only on I and X depends on no other variables, i.e. I is the 
only cause of X.  
(c) I is not a direct cause of Y, and if I is a cause of Y then I is an indirect 
cause of Y via a causal path leading through X and a – possibly empty 
– set of intermediate variable Z1, …, Zn.  
(d) I is probabilistically independent of other causes W1, …, Wn of Y, 
which are not on a causal path leading from X to Y .  
(e) I does not alter the relationship between Y and its causes W1, …, Wn, 
which are not on a causal path leading from X to Y. 
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The notion of an intervention variable is, in turn, used to define the notion of an 
intervention: any value ii of an intervention variable I (for X relative to Y) is an 
intervention on X iff it is the case that the value of X counterfactually depends on 
the fact that I has the value ii (cf. Woodward 2003: 98). Among other features of 
interventions, Woodward stresses the modal character of interventions. 
Interventions are not required to be possible in the sense that they are feasible 
actions for human agents. Woodward’s key idea consists in the assumption that it 
is in principle possible, or logically possible, to intervene. As I stated in SECTION 
1, the main goal of this paper is to investigate the modal character of interventions 
and the problems arising from it. 
 
3. A Counterexample: Why Some Interventions Are Not Even 
Physically Possible 
Recall that according to Woodward, if X is a direct cause of Y, then there is a 
possible intervention on X that changes Y. One might wonder which kind of 
possibility is in play in the interventionist theory of causation. Could the required 
kind of possibility simply refer to the abilities of human agents to intervene? 
Woodward and other interventionists explicitly (and rightly, I think) deny that 
interventions have to be practically possible, i.e. interventions are not required to 
be feasible actions for human beings. Woodward (2003: 103f., 123-127) argues 
against this anthropocentric concept of an intervention as defended by advocates 
of agency theories of causation (such as Menzies & Price 1993). Woodward 
objects that agency theories are committed to two problematic metaphysical 
claims: (a) the capacity of agents to intervene is “a fundamental and irreducible 
feature of the world and not just a variety of causal interaction among others” (p. 
123), and (b) an agency theory “leads us toward an undesirable kind of 
anthropomorphism or subjectivism regarding causation” (p. 123). As Woodward 
believes that causal claims have mind-independent truth-makers, he rejects 
practical possibility (or abilities of an agent to intervene) as the right kind of 
modality required for his concept of an intervention.   
So, is it adequate to think that interventions are physically possible? 
Woodward addresses this question by presenting and discussing a counterexample 
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against the assumption that physically possible interventions are necessary for 
determining the truth conditions of causal claims: 
 
Suppose that […] [X]s occur only spontaneously in the sense that they themselves 
have no causes. There are no further factors [I1, …, In] that affect whether or not 
[X] happens, and this is a matter of physical law. (I take this at least to be a 
logically coherent possibility.) Thus, it is physically impossible to carry out an 
intervention that changes whether [X] occurs. Nonetheless, it seems quite possible 
that the [X]s themselves might well have further effects [Y]. (Woodward 2003: 
130, my emphasis, my alteration of notation) 
 
The general form of Woodward’s counterexample is: 
 
 X is a cause of Y but there is no physically possible intervention I = i on X. 
 
I will distinguish two senses of “spontaneously” in the quote by Woodward.  
  
(i) There are cases in which there is no physically possible deterministic 
intervention but there is a physically possible indeterministic 
intervention on X, and  
(ii) There are cases in which there is neither a physically possible 
deterministic intervention nor a physically possible indeterministic 
intervention on X.  
 
Two concrete examples from physics illustrate these cases: 
 
(i) The No-Deterministic-But-Indeterministic Intervention Case. Uranium decays 
“only spontaneously” in the sense that there is no deterministic, physically 
possible way to manipulate Uranium such that it surely decays at a time t. 
Nonetheless, the decay of Uranium causes a flash on a screen (as a 
measurement in an experimental setup). Yet, one can raise the probability that 
the Uranium atom decays (e.g. by increasing the energy of the nucleus of the 
Uranium atom). In other words, there is a physically possible indeterministic 
intervention on Uranium decay. 
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(ii) The Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic Intervention Case. Tim 
Maudlin (2002: 149f) presents the Big Bang as a case where there is neither a 
deterministic physically possible way to intervene, nor an indeterministic way 
to intervene. In other words, according to Maudlin’s example, there is no 
physically possible indeterministic cause of the Big Bang which raises or 
lowers the probability of the occurrence of the Big Bang. Nonetheless, one 
would like to maintain that the Big Bang – if anything – has a plentitude of 
direct and indirect effects.    
 
I will describe the Big Bang case in detail in SECTION 4. However, my arguments 
do not depend on the Big Bang case. There are other “less cosmological” 
examples of the Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic Intervention Case. 
Although I will mainly focus on the Big Bang case in the rest of the paper, let me 
briefly present two other examples.   
Physical Constants. Many people intuitively believe that physical 
constants have a causal influence on the behavior of physical objects. For 
instance, the gravitational constant, the Planck constant, and the constant 
representing the speed of light can be taken to be causes. Still, it is physically 
impossible to intervene on a physical constant because changing the constants 
amounts to changing the physical laws in a non-local way. Changing the laws 
creates physically impossible worlds.6 Hence, we have another example of the 
Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic Intervention Case: if we assume that 
physical constants count as causes,7 then there is no physically possible 
intervention on a physical constant such that the value of the constant changes.8     
 Norton’s Dome. John Norton (2007: 22-28) argues for a case of uncaused 
events that is compatible with Newtonian mechanics. Norton imagines a 
symmetrically shaped dome that is located in downward directed gravitational 
                                                 
6 Woodward (2003: 208f) discusses the constant speed of light, and observes that the 
generalization “All physical processes propagate at a speed less than or equal to that of light” is 
not invariant under physically possible interventions.  
7 Of course, one can disagree with the assumption in the antecedent that physical constants are 
indeed causes. However, let us assume that they are causes at least for the sake of the argument.  
8 Thanks to Kristina Engelhard for suggesting this example. 
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field. A mass is at rest on top of the dome, on the apex. Let us represent the dome-
scenario by the following figure.  
 
 
Source: Norton 2007: 23. 
 
Norton claims that the following scenario is consistent with Newtonian 
mechanics:  
 
It is a mass at rest in a physical environment that is completely unchanging for an 
arbitrary amount of time – a day, a month, an eon. Then without any external 
intervention or any change in the physical environment, the mass spontaneously 
moves off in an arbitrary direction with the theory supplying no probabilities for 
the time or direction of the motion. (Norton 2007: 22f.)   
 
Norton interprets the acceleration of the mass as an uncaused event (cf. Norton 
2007: 24). I will use Norton’s dome scenario in the following way: suppose that 
the acceleration of the mass has an effect e (for instance, the mass hits a little bell 
that is located at the base of the dome).9 Further suppose that we posit very 
restricted worlds such that the worlds only contain the mass, the dome, the 
gravitational field, and the effect e. In these restricted dome-worlds, there exists 
no physically possible event that may play the role of an intervention on the mass, 
because all that exists in the restricted dome-worlds is the mass, the dome, the 
gravitational field, and the effect e. In other words, restricted dome-worlds 
conform to Norton’s initial description of the dome-scenario – the idea that the 
                                                 
9 This is an assumption that Norton is certainly not willing to go along with, because he denies that 
Newtonian mechanics (and other physical theories after Newton) describe causal relations. 
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“physical environment that is completely unchanging for an arbitrary amount of 
time” – in an extreme way by isolating the dome. Hence, in these restricted dome-
worlds it is the case that (a) the uncaused acceleration of the mass itself is a cause 
of event e, and (b) a physically possible intervention does not exist. In other 
words, we have a case of causation without the physical possibility to intervene. I 
conclude that, if the restricted version Norton’s dome-scenario is correct, then we 
have another example for the Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic 
Intervention Case.10 
The Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic Intervention Case is 
stronger than the No-Deterministic-But-Indeterministic Intervention Case, 
because Woodward can easily admit that interventions, and causation in general, 
need not be deterministic as assumed in the No-Deterministic-But-Indeterministic 
Intervention Case. However, one could insist that the definition of an intervention 
variable at least appears to presuppose that an intervention variable I for X is a 
deterministic cause of X, because the formulation that “I acts as a switch for all 
the other variables that cause X” (cf. Woodward 2003: 98, my emphasis), as it 
stands, seems to refer to deterministic causation only.11 If that were a correct way 
of understanding Woodward’s definition, then the Uranium case would be more 
problematic for interventionists. But be that as it may. A charitable reading of 
Woodward’s definition of an intervention should allow for indeterministic 
interventions.  
At any rate, the No-Deterministic-But-Indeterministic Intervention Case is 
only problematic conditional on the assumption that only deterministic physically 
possible interventions are allowed. In contrast, the Neither-Deterministic-Nor-
Indeterministic Intervention Case is unconditionally trouble for Woodward (as 
Woodward knows well), because there is absolutely no (neither deterministic nor 
indeterministic) physically possible way to intervene. For this reason, I will 
concentrate on the Neither-Deterministic-Nor-Indeterministic Intervention Case.  
 What do these counterexamples show? One might be inclined to object: 
“isn’t the Big Bang case a rather far-fetched counterexample from physics?”. 
However, even if these counterexamples are far-fetched ones from physics, they 
                                                 
10 I’d like to thank Carl Craver and John Norton for very helpful discussions of the dome-scenario. 
11 Thanks to Michael Baumgartner for pointing this out. 
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should raise the following suspicion: in general and apart from these specific 
cases of the counterexamples, the possibility to intervene on the cause X seems to 
be completely irrelevant for the truth conditions of “X causes Y”. Apart from this 
worry concerning the specific choice of counterexamples from physics, I think 
that the force of my arguments (that I will present in SECTION 4) does not 
necessarily depend on the existence of actual cases of the general form of the 
counterexample. All of my worries should still be justified even if it turned out 
that, as Woodward acknowledges, it is merely a “logically coherent possibility” 
(Woodward 2003: 130) that X is a cause of Y but there is no physically possible 
intervention I = i on X – even if there are no actual (physical) cases of this kind. 
 Woodward rejects these kinds of counterexamples by pointing out that 
interventions need not even be physically possible. Woodward (2003: 128f) 
understands the relevant sense physical possibility as follows:  
 
An intervention I = i is physically possible iff I = i is consistent with some 
set of possible initial conditions and the actual laws.12  
 
Woodward (2003: 128f) claims that the counterexamples show that an 
intervention on X is not be required to be physically possible. Instead of being 
physically possible, interventions are required to be possible in the sense that they 
are merely “logically possible” or not “ill-defined for conceptual or metaphysical 
reasons” (Woodward 2003: 128, 132). Note that, although Woodward introduces 
a distinction of logical, conceptual, and metaphysical possibility, he refers only to 
logical possibility in the large majority of cases and, further, he seems to use these 
kinds of modality interchangeably. For this reason, I will not explore the potential 
differences between these kinds of modality in this paper. 
 Is Woodward’s strategy to deal with the counterexamples by weakening 
the required notion of possibility really convincing? I think it is not. In the next 
                                                 
12 Woodward also considers another stronger reading of physical possibility: an intervention I = i 
is strongly physically possible iff I = i is consistent with actual initial conditions and the actual 
laws. However, Woodward – correctly, I think – dismisses strong physical possibility as a too 
demanding requirement for the interventionist theory of causation (cf. Woodward 2003: 128).  
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section, I will present two arguments against Woodward’s strategy to deal with 
the counterexamples.  
 
4. Two Arguments against the Need for Logically Possible 
Interventions 
In this section, I will present two arguments against Woodward’s above-
mentioned strategy. The first argument aims to establish that interventions are 
dispensable for Woodward’s semantic project as long as one allows for them to be 
merely logically possible. The second argument supports the claim that 
interventions with this modal character lead to the fatal result that interventionist 
counterfactuals are evaluated inadequately.  
 
First Argument  
The first argument addresses the claim that merely logically possible interventions 
can be dispensed with – which would be lead to a collapse of the interventionist 
theory as it stands. When I claim that merely logically possible interventions are 
dispensable I mean by this that interventions with this modal character fail to 
contribute non-trivially to the truth conditions of causal claims, i.e. interventions 
can be eliminated without loss. The conclusion of the first arguments is that 
interventions are dispensable for stating the truth conditions of causal claims such 
as “X is a direct type-level cause of Y”. In other words, the first argument is a 
dispensability argument. I use the notion of dispensability in analogy to its use in 
indispensability arguments in philosophy of mathematics (cf. Putnam 1975, Field 
1980): a term in a theory (in our case, the notion of an intervention) is dispensable 
if this term can be eliminated without compromising the strength of the theory 
(that is, the adequacy of an explication of causation).  
Suppose that the causal claim “the Big Bang is a cause of Y” is true (for 
some Y). According to the interventionist theory, “the Big Bang is a cause of Y” is 
true iff the following two interventionist counterfactuals are true: (a) “if there 
were an intervention I = i on the Big Bang such that the Big Bang occurred as it 
actually did, then Y = y would be the case as it actually is”, and (b) “if there were 
an intervention I = i* on the Big Bang such that the Big Bang were to occur 
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differently than it actually did, then Y would take a counterfactual value y*”. 
However, the existence of a logically possible intervention seems to be 
completely dispensable for stating the truth conditions of “the Big Bang is a cause 
of Y”. I will now begin to argue for this claim by way of an example of an 
intervention on the Big Bang suggested by Tim Maudlin. Having pointed out that 
it is neither practically nor physically possible to intervene on the Big Bang, 
Maudlin presents an instructive example of a physically impossible13 intervention 
on the Big Bang: 
 
It is surely physically impossible that the Big Bang have [sic!] been controlled 
[…] but it nonetheless has effects. Physical considerations […] may leave the 
philosophical mind unimpressed. It is at least metaphysically possible to control 
the Big Bang. God might decide, for example, to employ the following scheme: if 
He is forgiving the universe will be open, ever-expanding; if He is jealous the 
universe will be closed […]. (Maudlin 2002: 149f)  
 
Maudlin’s key idea can be put as follows: although there is no physically possible 
intervention on the Big Bang, God (I use italics for variables) is a logically 
possible (deterministic or indeterministic) intervention variable on the variable 
Big Bang relative to the variable Evolution of the Universe (after the Big Bang).14 
Maudlin’s scenario can be depicted by the following graph: 
 
God  
   Big Bang   Evolution of the Universe  
 
In this graph, the variables God, Big Bang and Evolution of the Universe have the 
following possible values: 
• The variable God ranges over the set of possible values {forgiving; 
jealous}.  
                                                 
13 Maudlin (2002: 150) describes the following scenario as “at least metaphysically possible”. I 
think that for this reason Maudlin’s example qualifies for my current purpose. 
14 One might object that “there is a cause of the Big Bang” is conceptually impossible, because, by 
definition, the Big Bang cannot have a physical cause. Since God need not be a physical being 
Maudlin’s example nicely avoids the objection that an intervention on the Big Bang is 
conceptually ill-defined.  
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• The binary variable Big Bang ranges over the set of possible values {1, 2}. 
These values represent two different ways in which the Big Bang might 
have taken place, as Maudlin’s scenario suggests that the two possible 
moods of god (i.e. to be jealous and to be forgiving) lead to different 
initial conditions of the universe.  
• The variable Evolution of the Universe has the values {open, closed}.  
 
Let me re-describe Maudlin’s divine intervention scenario in terms of 
interventions on Big Bang. 
 
(a) God is a cause of the Big Bang. 
(b) There is at least some value of God such that if God takes this value, 
then Big Bang depends only on God and Big Bang depends on no other 
variables, i.e. God is the only cause of Big Bang.  
(c) God is not a direct cause of Evolution of the Universe, and if God is a 
cause of Evolution of the Universe then God is an indirect cause of 
Evolution of the Universe via a causal path leading through Big Bang 
and a – possibly empty – set of intermediate variable Z1, …, Zn.  
(d) God is probabilistically independent of other causes W1, …, Wn of the 
Evolution of the Universe, which are not on a causal path leading from 
the Big Bang to the Evolution of the Universe. 
(e) God does not alter the relationship between Evolution of the Universe 
and its causes W1, …, Wn, which are not on a causal path leading from 
Big Bang to Evolution of the Universe. 
 
If God takes either of the values in its range, then the probability increases that the 
Big Bang takes place in a different manner (as indicated by Big Bang’s range {1, 
2}) and different evolutions of the universe result (as indicated by Evolution of the 
Universe’s range {open, closed}). All of this is in perfect accordance with 
Maudlin’s story about the possible scenarios. Thus, each of the statements God = 
forgiving and God = jealous represents a merely logically possible intervention on 
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Big Bang relative to Evolution of the Universe. Maudlin’s scenario illustrates a 
merely logically possible intervention on the Big Bang. 
 Clearly, interventionists are committed to accept the presented intervention 
– because it is logically possible that there is something about the moods of God 
that has the desired intervening effect on the Big Bang. Obviously, it is easy to 
come up with many other examples of merely logically possible interventions 
(e.g., the physical constants case and the restricted dome case, see SECTION 3). If 
this is correct, then a problem arises for the interventionist: once one admits 
merely logically possible interventions, interventions become semantically 
dispensable. Let me argue for this claim by focusing on the Big Bang scenario: 
suppose that the causal claim “Big Bang is a cause of Evolution of the Universe” 
is true. Interventionists claim that “Big Bang is a cause of Evolution of the 
Universe” is true, roughly, iff the following two interventionist counterfactuals 
are true: (a) “if there were an intervention God = forgiving on Big Bang such that 
the Big Bang = 1, then it would be the case that Evolution of the Universe = 
open”, and (b) “if there were an intervention God = jealous on Big Bang such that 
the Big Bang = 2, then it would be the case that Evolution of the Universe = 
closed”. In this scenario, the existence of a logically possible intervention 
apparently becomes dispensable for stating the truth conditions of “Big Bang is a 
cause of Evolution of the Universe”, because the existential claim “there is a 
logically possible intervention on Big Bang” (say, in the second counterfactual) 
does not add anything substantial to the following counterfactual (in which the 
existential claim about the intervention is eliminated):  
 
“if it were the case that Big Bang = 2, and other causes of Evolution of the 
Universe, W1, …, Wn, had been held fixed (if there are any), then it would 
be the case that Evolution of the Universe = closed, and it is not a logical 
contradiction to say that the Big Bang = 2”. 
 
To say the least, it is not obvious what one gains by adding an existential claim 
about a merely logically possible intervention to the conditional above. We seem 
to be able to provide a complete description of the causal information contained in 
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the Big Bang scenario by simply using counterfactuals that do not refer to 
interventions. However, the argument for the dispensability of Woodwardian 
interventions is ultimately justified in three ways. The details of the dispensability 
argument are provided in Reutlinger (2011). I merely intend to provide a sketch of 
the arguments here. 
First, if we can find a successful semantics for counterfactuals that does 
not rely on Woodwardian interventions, then Woodwardian interventions are 
dispensable for stating the truth-conditons of counterfactuals. Several standard 
accounts of semantics for counterfactuals are in fact able to successfully evaluate 
the conditional above without employing the Woodwardian notion of an 
intervention (these standard accounts are presented in the second argument below; 
recent improvements of the standard accounts include Pearl 2000, Schaffer 2004, 
Leitgeb forthcoming).15 Thus, Woodwardian interventions are dispensable for 
stating the truth-conditions of counterfactuals. 
Second, if a counterfactual theory of causation – that makes use of these 
(improved) standard semantics for counterfactuals – is able to satisfy the criteria 
of adequacy for a theory of causation at least as well as the interventionist theory, 
then interventions seem to be dispensable for an adequate theory of causation. 
There are such theories of causation. Thus, interventions are dispensable.  
Let me provide some details and examples here. For instance, an adequate 
theory of causation is expected to satisfy the following criteria of adequacy:  
a. an adequate theory ought to explicate several kinds of causation that are 
referred to in the sciences (e.g. actual causes, type-level causes, 
deterministic and indeterministic causes, contributing and total causes).  
b. An adequate theory of causation has to account for several typical features 
of causation (e.g. the time-asymmetry of causation, the sensitivity to 
changes in background conditions, a distinction between genuine 
causation and accidental correlation).  
                                                 
15 Although Pearl (2000) relies on the notion of an intervention, a Pearlian intervention differs 
from a Woodwardian intervention because the former is not committed to the view that 
interventions have to be modeled as exogenous causes. A Pearlian intervention simply amounts to 
assigning a specific value to variable X in a causal model while other causal influence are 
disrupted. This assignment of a value to X is not required to be modeled as the result of an 
exogenous cause I (i.e. an intervention variable as in the Woodwardian case). I do not raise any 
objections to the Pearlian kind of interventions. 
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c. It is a criterion of adequacy to provide a successful description of 
intuitively possible causal scenarios (such as preemption scenarios, 
common cause scenarios, and common-cause scenarios).  
In my (2011: chapter 8), I argue for a counterfactual theory of causation – the 
comparative variability theory – which preserves crucial features of the 
interventionist account (without relying on interventions, of course). Most 
importantly, my counterfactual approach adopts a key feature of Woodward’s 
theory that guarantees its (limited) success: specific background conditions (i.e. 
variables that are not on a directed path from the cause variable to the effect 
variable) have to be held fixed in a possible situation in which the cause variable 
takes a counterfactual value.16 The upshot of my approach is that causal 
dependence amounts to conditional counterfactual dependence – i.e. conditional 
on a certain fixed causal background, a causal field (cf. Field 2003: 452). 
However, this feature of holding fixed the causal background can be preserved 
even if the notion of an intervention is eliminated. I argue that the comparative 
variability theory is able to satisfy the above-listed criteria of adequacy at least as 
well as the interventionist (and, in some cases, even better). Thus, interventions 
are dispensable. However, this result does not exclusively depend on my 
particular theory of causation. Other counterfactual theories that do not employ 
the strong Woodwardian notion of an intervention (such as Field 2003, Schaffer 
2004, Halpern & Pearl 2005, Menzies 2007) can also be used to establish the 
dispensability argument.  
Third, I will argue in the second argument (below) that there is no easy 
way out for interventionists: it is unfortunately not the case that interventions are 
dispensable but harmless. Woodwardian interventions are not harmless because 
they lead to a severe problem regarding the evaluation of counterfactuals.17 If 
interventions create their own problems (given that we can state the truth-
conditions of counterfactual conditionals and causal claims without referring to 
                                                 
16 Woodward uses the notion of the redundancy range in order to hold fixed the causal background 
(cf. Woodward 2003: 83). 
17 In Reutlinger (under review), I present another problem for interventionists: they fail to account 
for the time-asymmetry of causation. 
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interventions), then we have an additional reason to eliminate interventions 
without regret.   
I conclude from these three considerations that intervention can be 
eliminated without loss. In other words, they are dispensable. Tim Maudlin 
suggests a similar conclusion with respect to his scenario of a physically 
impossible divine intervention on the Big Bang:  
 
The temptation to use these fantastic theological scenarios does not arise from 
any deep conceptual connection between causation and signals [or 
‘controllability’ as Maudlin also says – these expressions are equivalent with 
possible interventions in our case]. The scenarios rather illustrate a 
counterfactual connection: had the Big Bang been different so would the later 
course of the universe have been. (Maudlin 2002: 150, my emphasis)  
 
The upshot of discussing Maudlin’s divine intervention scenario is that merely 
logically possible interventions turn out to be eliminable without loss. As Maudlin 
points out, the decisive issue is counterfactual dependence which can be stated 
without reference to (merely logically possible) interventions.  
 
Second Argument 
The second argument against logically possible interventions relies on three 
alternative approaches to the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. Let me 
briefly motivate why determining the truth conditions of counterfactuals matters 
for our present concerns. Let us recall the motivation for employing interventions. 
The main motivation for introducing interventions is closely tied to 
counterfactuals. Woodward’s definitions of causation imply a specific kind of 
counterfactuals whose arguments are propositions that some variable takes a 
certain value in its range: “if there were an intervention I = i on X such that X = x, 
then Y = y would be the case” (cf. Woodward 2003: 15). In the first argument, I 
argued that logically possible interventions are dispensable for the truth 
conditions of causal statements. Now, in the second argument, I will change the 
perspective: for the sake of the argument, I will grant that merely logically 
possible interventions do play an indispensable role for the interventionist theory. 
I argue that Woodward has to pay price for this claim: merely logically possible 
interventions lead to the fatal result that interventionist counterfactuals involving 
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existential claims about merely logically possible interventions are inadequately 
evaluated as false. If this reasoning were sound, this would also be an unwelcome 
result for interventionists. Call this the Problem of Inadequate Evaluation. I will 
show that Problem of Inadequate Evaluation is fatal for the interventionist theory 
of causation by proceeding in this way: I argue that the Problem of Inadequate 
Evaluation remains a problem for these standard semantics. And, I will argue that 
even if one relies on one of a variant of interventionist semantics one fails to 
provide a satisfying solution to the Problem of Inadequate Evaluation, because 
relying on interventionist semantics is either (i) ad hoc, (ii) non-practical, or (iii) 
subject to the dispensability argument. For brevity’s sake, I will restrict the 
second argument to the strong case of merely logically possible interventions on 
the Big Bang.  
The modal character of logically possible interventions is not as innocent 
as Woodward suggests, because possible worlds at which interventions of this 
kind exist deviate strongly from the actual world with respect to laws of nature. 
This is problematic for interventionists because: (a) interventionists crucially rely 
on (interventionist) counterfactuals, and (b) worlds with strongly different laws 
are ruled out for the evaluation of counterfactuals by the three standard 
approaches to the semantics of counterfactuals. Consequently, if we evaluate 
counterfactuals in worlds where merely logically possible interventions on the 
antecedent variable exist, then the counterfactuals are false (Problem of 
Inadequate Evaluation).  
 Let me argue for this claim in more detail. Assume there is a world w such 
that a merely logically possible intervention on the Big Bang exists in w. By 
definition, worlds where merely logically possible interventions exist are 
physically impossible worlds, i.e. worlds differing in laws from the actual world. 
According to our example, a world where an intervention is carried out on the Big 
Bang instantiates laws of nature that differ from the actual laws (namely, it is in 
accordance with these other-worldly laws that there is a deterministic or an 
indeterministic intervention on the Big Bang). Yet, is it the case that any violation 
of actual laws in a world w rules out w for the evaluation of counterfactuals 
(which are true or false in the actual world)? The answer is “No”. One might 
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wonder whether a logically possible intervention is just a local violation of a law. 
For this reason, an intervention is sometimes (cf. Woodward 2003: 135f) 
compared to a small miracle in the similarity heuristic of Lewis’s semantics (cf. 
Lewis 1979: 47f.). According to Lewis, the closest possible worlds are those that 
differ minimally from the actual world in particular matters of fact such that a 
counter-nomological (i.e. violating the laws of the actual world) event m occurs 
just before the antecedent event c (the cause) occurs. The event m is a small 
miracle because after the occurrence of m (i.e. after setting new initial conditions) 
the world again conforms to the actual laws. But note that this comparison is not 
wholly justified: although interventions and small miracles are both changes of 
particular matters of fact in possible worlds, Lewis does not argue that small 
miracles are causes of the antecedent event c in question. And it is precisely the 
causal character of interventions – which interventionists explicitly highlight – 
that leads into trouble. 
 There is a further and even more important reason to believe that an 
intervention on the Big Bang has to be clearly distinguished from a small miracle. 
In the closest worlds at which the actual laws are preserved to a maximal degree, 
there is no small miracle (that is, no set of counterfactual initial conditions) such 
that a state of the world evolves in which the Big Bang occurs differently than it 
actually does. In other words, such an intervention is not even possible in the 
sense of physical possibility. As opposed to that, worlds in which merely logically 
possible interventions exist instantiate physically impossible (viewed from the 
actual world) nomic connections between the intervention variable God and the 
cause variable Big Bang. Woodward seems to be committed to these physically 
impossible nomic connections: Woodward argues that true (actual and type-level) 
causal statements are “backed up” by at least non-strict, invariant generalizations 
(cf. Woodward 2003: 146f, 244; also his definition M of causation, p. 59, implies 
invariant relation between causal relata; pp. 245-255 on the claim that causal 
relations are backed up by invariant generalizations). In other words, there is an 
invariant (or, in some cases, nomic), repeatable connection between a type of 
intervention (e.g. God = forgiving) and a type of cause (e.g. Big Bang = 1) in 
world w. Thus, if it is true in a world w that there is an intervention on Big Bang 
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(i.e., according to the definition of an intervention, at least “God is a cause of Big 
Bang” is true in w), then there is an invariant generalization (or law) in world w 
that “backs up” this the causal relation between the intervention variable God and 
the cause variable Big Bang. I conclude that interventions differ from small 
miracles. Merely-logically possible-intervention-worlds are worlds with truly 
different, non-actual laws in the sense that they are counter-legal to a higher 
degree than small-miracle-worlds are.  
 This result is quite problematic: according to the three standard semantics 
of counterfactuals, worlds truly differing in laws from the actual world are not 
adequate to evaluate counterfactuals.  
 
(I) According to Lewis’s possible worlds semantics, a counterfactual is (non-
vacuously) true iff the consequent is true in the closest antecedent-worlds 
(cf. Lewis 1973: 16). Worlds that differ in laws in higher degree than 
small miracle worlds are not among the closest antecedent-worlds that are 
relevant for fixing the truth conditions of counterfactuals (cf. Lewis 1979: 
47f). Thus, (merely logically possible) intervention-worlds are not among 
the closest worlds, i.e. they are big-miracle worlds involving global 
violations of actual laws. 
(II) According to the meta-linguistic account (Goodman 1983), a 
counterfactual is true iff the consequent can be logically derived from a set 
of premises consisting of  (1) laws of nature, and (2) the antecedent and 
other initial conditions. Using truly non-actual law statements as premises 
seems to be misguided, if one would like to evaluate a counterfactual at 
the actual world. According to the Goodmanian approach, it is the case 
that if a counterfactual is supposed to be true at the actual world, then the 
consequent has to be inferred from (maximally) actual laws (that do not 
include counterfactual invariant connections between a merely logically 
possible type of intervention and a type of cause) and singular statements. 
(III) According to the suppositional theory (Ramsey 1929: 247, Adams 1975: 
Chapter 4, Skyrms 1994, Edgington 2008), a conditional is acceptable (to 
the degree that) if one “hypothetically” adds the antecedent to one’s 
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knowledge, then one also believes that the consequent is true.18 This 
procedure is known as the Ramsey-Test. Beliefs about which laws are true 
in the actual world are important for carrying out the Ramsey-Test (cf. 
Leitgeb forthcoming Section 2). Supposing that p and adding p to a stock 
of beliefs including truly non-actual laws does not make sense. The 
relevant epistemically possible worlds (in a communicative situation) are 
at least partly constituted by maximally actual laws (that, again, do not 
include counterfactual invariant connections between a type of a merely 
logically possible intervention and a type of cause).     
 
To sum up, merely logically possible worlds in which there are interventions on 
the Big Bang are truly counter-legal (i.e. they are counter-legal to a higher and 
more global degree than small-miracle-worlds). This result leads to a conflict with 
the three standard semantics of counterfactuals: if we evaluate a counterfactual in 
worlds with truly non-actual laws, then we have to evaluate this counterfactual as 
false. Therefore, worlds where interventions on the Big Bang exist are not 
appropriate for evaluating counterfactuals: they lead to inadequate results 
(Problem of Inadequate Evaluation). For instance, we have to say, from an 
interventionist point of view, that the counterfactual “if the Big Bang had 
occurred differently, then it universe would have evolved differently” is false, 
because interventionists reformulate this conditional by adding an existential 
claims about a merely logically possible intervention on the Big Bang to the 
antecedent of the conditional.  
Now, the burden of proof is on the interventionists’ side: interventionists 
have to show (a) why the standard approaches are wrong in rejecting merely 
logically possible interventions, and (b) how to evaluate counterfactuals with a 
                                                 
18 The basic idea of the Ramsey-Test was historically first used to determine the assertability 
conditions of indicative conditionals by Adams (1975). Adams analyzes the degree of assertability 
of an indicative conditional in terms of subjective probability: the degree of assertability of “if p, 
then will q” equals the subjective probability of q given p. Although this fact is often ignored, 
Adams (1975: Chapter 4) also argues that the suppositional theory can be applied to 
counterfactuals in a slightly modified way. In particular, Skyrms has developed the most 
sophisticated account of Adams’s original idea. According to Skyrms (1994: 13-15), one 
determines the pragmatic meaning of a counterfactual in terms of the degree of assertability: the 
degree of assertability of the counterfactual “if it were the case that p, then it would be that case 
that q” equals the subjectively expected objective conditional probability of q given p. 
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semantics that includes interventions. This is, of course, an unpleasant result for 
interventionists. 
Yet, let us take a step back. Maybe the situation is not so unpleasant for 
interventionists after all. A natural response to my second argument could consist 
in adopting an interventionist semantics of counterfactuals. As already mentioned 
in Section 1, an interventionist might propose an interventionist version of 
possible worlds semantics along the following lines: a counterfactual is true iff the 
consequent is true in the closest antecendent-worlds. The closest worlds are those 
worlds in which the antecedent is true in virtue of an intervention on the 
antecedent-variable (cf. Reutlinger 2011: Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion 
of this semantics as well as for Goodmanian and suppositionalist versions of 
interventionist semantics).  
Although turning to interventionist semantics might be a tempting option 
for an advocate of an interventionist theory of causation, this strategy does not 
help to refute the second argument for three reasons.  
First, adopting an interventionist semantics comes close to an ad hoc move 
in order to vindicate the interventionist theory of causation. It might be correct 
that the interventionist semantics can handle counterexamples to Lewis’s original 
semantics of counterfactuals. Dealing with these counterexamples successfully is 
a prima facie reason in favor of interventionist semantics. However, the 
interventionist semantics does not explicitly presuppose a specific modal 
character of interventions. Building the problematic assumption of the existence 
of merely logically possible interventions into the semantics of counterfactuals 
seems to be motivated by one goal only: one excludes cases in which intervening 
is physically impossible (such as the Big Bang scenario) as counter-examples to 
the interventionist theory. Therefore, legitimizing merely logically possible 
interventions by incorporating them into the interventionist semantics is an ad hoc 
move to defend the interventionist theory, and therefore it is not convincing.  
Second, Woodward argues that his interventionist theory is a “practical” 
theory of causation – by contrast Lewis’s counterfactual theory and Dowe’s 
conserved quantity theory are “impractical” theories (cf. Woodward 2003: 28-38). 
According to Woodward, a theory of causation is “practical” if it succeeds to 
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“connect causal knowledge with some goal that has practical utility” (cf. 
Woodward 2003: 30). Examples of a goal that has practical utility are successful 
manipulation (for instance, in medical, political, and scientific contexts) and 
reliable experimentation in the sciences. So, Woodward claims that if we come to 
believe that “X causes Y” and we understand the truth conditions of this claim in 
accord to the interventionist theory, then we can easily connect this causal 
knowledge to practical goals such as manipulation and experimentation. For 
instance, if we endorse an interventionist theory of causation, we know that we 
are in principle able to manipulate the effect Y by manipulating the cause X. We 
also know that if we want to design an experimental set-up which involves Y, then 
the belief that X causes Y is indeed relevant (for instance, because we might want 
to isolate Y from its cause X, or because we might want to exploit the causal 
relation between X and Y for manipulation within the experiment). However, even 
if one agrees with Woodward that theories of causation ought to be practical in 
the sense he suggests a problem arises for the interventionist: if one allows 
interventions to be merely logically possible, then the interventionist theory loses 
its practical character. For example, suppose that there it is merely logically 
possible to intervene on the Big Bang, and suppose that the statement “the Big 
Bang causes event e” is true. It is hard to see which practical goal can be achieved 
by this causal knowledge. For instance, if we had the goal to manipulate e then the 
interventionist theory does not explain how we can realize this goal because it is 
merely logically possible to change e by intervening on the Big Bang. I doubt that 
the knowledge that the occurrence of e counterfactually depends on the change of 
the Big Bang which is the outcome of a merely logically possible intervention 
satisfies Woodward’s own requirement that a theory of causation ought to explain 
why we pursue certain practical goals. Quite the opposite is the case: accepting 
merely logically possible interventions undermines the appraised practical 
character of the interventionist theory of causation, because the link to practical 
goals (such as successful manipulation and reliable experimental practice in the 
sciences) is disrupted in cases involving interventions with this modal character. 
Therefore, relying on an interventionist semantics which allows merely logically 
possible interventions is not convincing. 
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Third, if an interventionist attempts to refute the second argument by 
adopting an interventionist semantics, then merely logically possible interventions 
still remain subject to the dispensability argument. As argued above, merely 
logically possible interventions are dispensable. If interventions are dispensable 




Interventionists require that interventions be merely logically possible. I have 
argued against this requirement by establishing two claims: first, merely logically 
possible interventions are dispensable for stating the truth conditions of causal 
claims. If this is true, then the interventionist theory, as it stands, collapses. 
Second, counterfactuals involving merely logically possible interventions lead to 
the fatal result that interventionist counterfactuals are inadequately false. This is 
likewise an unwelcome result for interventionists. I conclude that if we attempt to 
master the tasks of explicating causal concepts and stating the truth conditions of 
causal claims we best get rid of Woodwardian interventions. 
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